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ABSTRACT
LEARNING, INFLATION, AND 
THE PHILLIPS CURVE 
Kaplan, Duygu
M.A, Department o f Economics 
Supei-visor: Assistant Professor Dr. Erdem Başçı
August 2000
The Replicator Dynamics o f Evolutionary Game Theory is introduced in a closed 
economy so as to model how a continuum o f firms evolve over time with respect to the 
pricing strategies. Incorporation- o f Replicator Dynamics facilitates modelling 
microeconomic frictions that lead to a Phillips Curve on the macroeconomic level. I'he 
firms are boundedly rational players which are learning, and are apt to make mistakes. 
Mistakes function as a mutation process and prevent a strategy from becoming extinct. 
An arbitrary non-empty set o f consumers face a cash-in-advance constraint and total 
consumption spending is symmetrically affected by changes in growth rate o f money 
supply which is stochastic. Using a discrete price set, we introduce heterogeneity o f firm 
behaviour in a single homogenous good market. The economy is simulated ibr a large 
number o f finitely many time periods. A Phillips Curve type linkage between infiation 
and output is recognized at stationary states. The slope o f the Phillips Curve is observed 
to increase as mean o f money growth rate gets higher or as the uncertainty in money 
growth rate is increased. Slope o f the Phillips Curve diminishes as price stickiness is 
intensified by either reducing the mistake level or by increasing the firms' 
responsiveness to relative payoff realizations.
Keywords: Phillips Cuiwe, Replicator Dynamics, Learning, Inflation
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ÖZET
ÖĞRENME, ENFLASYON VE PHILLIPS EĞRİSİ 
Kaplan, Duygu
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi; Yardımcı Doçent Dr. Erdem Başçı
Ağustos 2000
Evrimsel Oyun Kuramının öne sürdüğü Replikator Dinamiği kavramı, kapalı bir 
ekonomide firmaların fiyatlandırma stratejileri açısından zaman içinde nasıl 
evrimleştiğini tanımlamak için kullanılmıştır. Firmalar öğrenen, ancak hata yapan 
kısmen rasyonel oyunculardır. Hatalar mutasyon sürecini sağlar ve popülasyonda 
herhangi bir stratejinin yok olmasını önler. Boş olmayan herhangi bir tüketiciler 
kümesinde, bir ön-ödeme kısıtı çerçevesinde, toplam tüketim harcamaları para arzının 
büyüme hızındaki stokastik davranıştan simetrik olarak etkilenir. Sürekli olmayan 
fiyatlandırma stratejileri kümesi, tek ve homojen mal piyasasında farklı firma 
davranışlarının modellenmesini sağlar. Ekonomi, sonlu ancak büyük sayıda ardışık 
dönem için simule edilmiştir. Ulaşılan durağan durumda enflasyon ve üretim arasında 
Phillips Eğrisinin öne sürdüğü pozitif ilişki görülmüştür. Ortalama para büyümesi hızı 
ya da para büyümesindeki belirsizlik arttıkça eğrinin eğimi artar. Öte yandan, firmaların 
tcpkisclliği arttırıldığında ya da hata oranlan azaltıldığında Phillips eğrisinin eğiminde 
azalma gözlemlenmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Phillips Eğrisi, Replikatör Dinamiği, Öğrenme, Enflasyon
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The literature on money-output trade-off and Pliillii)s curv(i is extreiiudy vast. 
The controversy on the answers to the question ‘Is money neutral?’ leads to a 
wide literature of both theoretical and ernprical studies with clashing conclu­
sions. Lucas (1972, 1973) claims only unexpected monetary policy cmn have 
real effects. On the other hand, ovcrlapi)ing contract models ('I'aylor, 1979), 
sticky price models (Rotemberg 1982, 1994; Blanchard, 1990), and limitcid 
participation models (Grossman and Weiss, 1983; Rotemberg, 1984; Alvarc'/, 
and Atkeson, 1997) generate real effects of money. CocTraiui (1998) i)oints 
out that, even Lucas’ (1972) model generates effects of anticipatc'd money if 
money is injectcid by propoitional transfer, d'lui lil,(!iatui(; on nominal G.NP 
targetting (Feldstein and Stock, 1994: Hall and Mankiw,1994) favour tlu' 
real effects of monetary disturbances. Still, the cash-in-advanc(' models with 
adjustments costs (Fuerst, 1992; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992, 1995)
yield more traditional coiiseciueiices of anticipated and nna.nticii)ated inomiy. 
Römer and Römer (1994) claim that systematic i)olicy endcid ix)st\var re­
cessions. They also investigatcid the real effects of moiHitaiy disturbance's 
in post-war US monetary history, identifying six ejoisodes wluu'ei tlu! FcMleral 
Rxiserve attem])ted to crea,te a recession to reduce! inflation in R.emu'r anel 
Re)iner
The i)re)l)lem is still alive. R,ee;ently, Shi (1998), Karras anel Ste>kes (1999), 
Le)o anel Lastrapeis (1998), Keiating anel Nye (1999), Ce)chraii(! (1998), Swan­
son (1998), nine and Bisedioff (1998) focus on the money-e)utput re!latie)u 
thre)ngh emprical analysers. Cooley and Quaelrini (1999) prese:nt a Ne'oclassi- 
cal model e)f the Phillips curve relation.
In this tluisis, we! e:e)nstruct a frame:wenk wliiedi incorporate's the! ie:plicat,e)r 
dynamiers of the evolutionary ai)proach, in a small e;lose'el ece)nomy subje'e;( 
to stochastic shoe:ks in nioneiy growth. The agents consist e)f a e:e)ntinuum ed' 
firms anel an arbitrary non-empty set of consumers. The firms are bemnele!elly 
rational anel are aj)t to make mistakers in their i)ricing ele!e:isie)iis. Ce)nsume!rs 
fae:e a cash-in-advance constraint and are fully rational in the! se'nse that 
theiy spe!nel all the mone!y theiy hold, as long as sni)])ly is available'. Tlie'v 
start purchasing frenn the h)we!st price. The:refore!, the! shoe ks te> the' me'an 
of money gre)wth rate are! e)bserveel by the firms as nenninal ele!inanel she)e;ks. 
There euxists one! he)nioge!iieons gooel, proeliie:e!el anel solel by a he'tere)ge'ne)us 
set of firms which are differentiated in their pricing de'e;.isie)ns.
The pricing strate!gy of a firm is det(!rmiimd by its inflatie)n expe'ctatie)ii.
Assuming tluvt, a iirm will iiicrcasc its i)iice according (.o Uic inilaUon expec­
tation it holds, the firms and consumers, repeatedly come togxitlier and j)lay 
a game. At each period, the distribution of firms over the availal)le i)ricing 
strategies are updated according to the replicator dynamics of (evolutionary 
game theory, the formulation of which is due to Taylor and .lonkc'r (1978). 
The replicator dynamics we use liere, relates the i)ercentage changie in thee 
density of firms following a certain strategy in a given p(eriod to tine ratio 
of the payoff from that strategy to the average payoff of the society in that 
period. The set of possible inflation expectation is exogenous, tlnnefore, the 
firms’ prices are to be discretely determined in each period.
Introducing the mistake level in the economy, a certain share of the jiopu- 
lation is distributed uniformly over all the strategies in each [leriod, r(!gardless 
of previous period’s ¡layoff realizations. Analogous to the mutation ¡nociiss 
of the evolutionary approach, the mistakes jirevent any of the varic'ties, \.c. 
the strategies in the model, from getting extinct. The firms ¡K'rcc'ive theur 
own payoff, which is an increasing function of their profit realizations. At 
any given period, the distribution of the firms over the finite set of strategies 
describes the state of the world. Given the state of th(( world, the aggr(!gate 
price level in the economy is a.verag(id oven- the ¡n iccis of tlui goods sold in 
that period. Besides, the real ¡nofits are calculated by dividing the profits of 
a tyiie of linn by the previous period’s aggicgatci pricci l(>v(T 'riui ¡noductions 
costs are assumed to be zero up to a unit ca|)acity.
The simple economy is an attempt to model the effects of microeconomic 
frictions on the macroeconomic relations. Our contribution is the incorjiora-
tion of replicator cl3oiainics from the evolutionary approach. Simulating such 
an economy, it is aimed to identify whether a stationary state is reaclu'.d or 
not, at which a positive relation between money and output is observed. Af­
ter demonstrating the emergence of a Phillips curve type ndationslni) during 
the stationary state of the economy, the focus will be on the behaviour of 
the economy undcu· various parameter si)ecifications of the model.
In Chapter 2, a more detailed literature survey is i)res(mt(id. Tlui mode;! 
is introduced in Chai)ter 3. The results on the behaviour of the economy is 
described, through succe.ssive simulations under diilVircnt i)araniet(!r specifi­
cations, in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
2.1 On the Theory of Money-Output Trade­
off: New Classicals vs New Keynesians
The question of whether money is neutral is of central iin})ortance of macroe­
conomics. The first focus is on whether a change in the level of tlui money 
stock aflects the real values of any economic varialrles. Tlu! sc'cond is the 
superneutrality issue concerned with whether a change in tlui rate of growth 
of the money supply will aflect any real variahhis. N(M)classical ('conomics 
propose that money is neutral in the long run in the first s('iis(!. Tlu' new 
classical models of Lucas (1973, 1975), Sargent (1973, 197C), Sargent and 
Wallace (1975, 1976) and Barro (1976) conclude that anticipated mono'y 
will also be neutral in the short-run, in the presence of an underlying ratio­
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nal expectations assumption. On the snpenieutrality analysis, Tobin (19C5) 
suggested that changes in the inflation rate can affect the time path of the 
capital stock through influencing the real rate of return on nominal money 
balances. Keynesian macroeconomics are advocates of the idea that nominal 
demand shocks produce real effects, implicit is the notion that nominal wagci 
and price rigidities induce the economy to depart from full-employment'. 
Defina (1991) i)oints out that rationales for those rigidities have been ad 
hoc and thus have detracted from the theory’s ap[)eal. Models have been 
generated in which nominal rigidities appear (hie to agents’ o])timi'/,ing be­
haviour. Ball, Mankiw and Römer (1988) (henceforth BMll) suggested an 
attractive theorjc According to BMR, firms are able to set jirices, but at some 
costs, and so, price changes are not frequent. Moreover, only a fraction of 
all firms change prices at a time. The BMR model leads to aggregate ¡nice 
rigidities, so that nominal shocks have real effects on the economy. Naish 
(1986) investigates why money is unlikely to be suiierneutral and ¡nits the 
blame on the imperfectly flexible prices. As initially siielled out liy Fischer 
(1977) and Phelps and Taylor (1977), sticky prices and wages induce a sta­
bilization role for monetary policy. Naish (1986) discusses futherniore that 
sticky prices have additional eflects, causing the firm’s average hived of ont- 
¡)ut to depend on the antici[)ated rate of inflation. That the nominal prices 
are costly to adjust, most convincingly explains the ¡)ric(! stickiiuiss. Barro 
(1972) |)ioii(Xired this ai)proach,which is d(ivelo})ed by Sluishinski and Weiss 
(1977,1979), and Mu.ssa (1981), followed by Sluishinski and Weiss (1983),
Roternberg (1982a,b), Kuran (1983a,b) and Danziger (1983, 1984). This lit- 
'Lucas (1972), though not rcigarded a.s a Keyne.siaii, also cai)turos tlu! same idea hy his 
confusion model.
erature assumes firms do not change prices continuous!}^ since tliere are real 
menu costs emerging as a by-product of price changes.
The positive relation of high money growth with high real activity at 
business-cycle frequencies, has also been attributed to tlu' sticky prices. Usu­
ally, the main reasoning behind monetary noimeutrality is said to Ixi the im­
plicit or explicit contracts. In the past decade, few similarly explicit model 
economies have been presented assuming a role for nominal contracts from 
underlying assumptions about the economic environment and explain the im­
plications of contract arrangements for money and business cycles. Contract 
theory could not i)rovide a full justification, therefore the reasons behind 
sticky prices refer to the costs of price adjustment (Rotemlierg 1982, Park­
ing 1986) or on the multiplicity of rational-expectations eiiuilibria (A'/ariadis 
and Cooper, 1985b). Setting up a model which is a variant of Lucas (1972), 
Haubrich and King (1992) assume monetary changes are neutral toward real 
aggregates in the absence of contracts since economic agents accurately per­
ceive the changes. A Phillips curve emerges under two conditions: an in­
teraction of individual and aggregate uncertainty and an incomiileteness of 
markets, which is due to private information. Their results depend more on 
the existence of market incomiileteness than on specific rationale. Not all 
of the literature attempts to explain Phillips curve with sticky prices. In 
Farmer (1988) credit is taken to play the role for tlu; transmission m(;cha- 
nism. Much of the literature however tries to justify the sticky prices and 
wages led by the Gray (1976), Fisher (1977), and Taylor (1980). On the 
other hand, the bubble (self-fulfilling prophecy) literature attempts to ex­
plain sticky prices, output fluctuations and other busiii(;ss-cycle ])henom-
ena as market based occurrences tliat depend on expectations, not contracts 
(Azariadis and Guesnerie, 1986). Keeping the prices sticky but not fixed, 
the model of Haubrich and King (1992) generates a Phillips curv(i so that 
they examine the slope of the Phillips curve when the monetary variability 
is changed. Their results contradicts Barro’s (1976) statement that (dficient 
competitive contracts nectissarily reduce the dependence of output on nom­
inal money growth. Suppliers set prices before demand is realized and high 
money growth induces high output, a possible reasoning for which may b(i 
the insufficient adjiistement of prices. Defina (1991) tests the BMP, model 
empirically by focusing on a key prediction, the degree to which nominal 
shocks affect output varies inversely with the level of trend, namely, infla­
tion. As inflation happens to increase, firms’ ¡)iofit niaximising prices change 
more quickly on average. Since higher inflation causes more frequent price 
adjustment implying less rigidity, nominal shocks have smaller real (dlects as 
inflation gets higher.
Howciver, main theories of macroeconomics which ])ropose an output- 
inflation trade-off do not permit average inflation to have an effect on tlui 
trade-off including the imperfect inlormation model of Lucas (1973), attribut­
ing no real effects for nominal rigidities, and the traditional Keynesian mod­
els. The Keynesian models incorporate nominal rigidities, still, k(H'))ing the 
extent of rigidity fixed. Thus, the trade-oil is not d(!])end(int on tlu; clianges 
in the inflation rate. BMR’s negative impact thus i)rovid(is an alt(irnative to 
the prominent theories.
Defina (1991) examines the potential role for average inflation for forty-
three industrialized countries questioning tlie BMR thesis, while allowing the 
suggested pricing behaviour to vary in importance from country to countr}'. 
He states “If ‘menu costs’ are a strong and pervasive influence on ıtrice flex­
ibility, evidence that average inflation matters should arise; in a significant 
fraction of countries.” He concludes that average inflation has a negative and 
significant effect on the trade-off in a large fraction of countries. The result 
are aligned with cross-country study of BMR and US time, scries evidence; e)f 
Evans (1989). Beside;s, Sachs (1980) derives econometric Phillis curve esti­
mates, and identifies a decrease in the slope of the Phillips curve after the' 
World war II. He suggests that the public expected the monetary authoritie;s 
to take action so as to prevent price deflations and unemiiloyment anel the; 
long-term contracts were common. Therefore, higher rigiditie;s existe;el, which 
led to a diminishing slope of the Phillips curve.
The; BMR model preepeises that nominal shocks have smalle;r re'al e'ffe'e'.ts as 
the variance of aggregate shocks becomes higher. With increasing variability, 
firms’ profit maximising prices become more uncertain. Therefore;, firms tenel 
to pursue more flexible pricing strategieis. Defina (1991) concludes “since 
Lucas (1973) model is consistent with the; same inverse relation, the predicteel 
role of aggregate variability cannot be used to validate the BMR model. 
But sine;e; average; inflation anel aggregate variability e'e>ulel be e;e)ne'la(e'el, 
strong e;vielence for the BMR thesis reeiuire;s ave;rage; inflatie)n te> ma.tte;r afte;r 
accounting for variability.
Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) and Evans (1989) hael previously stoesseel
the implications for the monetary policy. To sum uj)2.
Their theory implies that the lower average injlation falls, the 
more, ■responsive 'is output to nominal shocks, s'ach as changes vn 
money g'lmuth. Hence, initial declmes in mpid 'i'liflatio'ii etiyi- 
neerred by a central bank might carry 7'elatively small output costs, 
b'ut attempts to eliminate inflation could beco'ine extremely expen­
sive.
BMR’s fundamental results are implied by the central Keynesian theories 
in which the degree of rigidity is endogenous, including the state-dependent 
pricing models In contrast, Caplin and Si)ulber (1987) i)rovide an example 
of a menu-cost model with predictions contradicting the BMR.
2.1.1 Menu Cost Models
)r
• h .
New Keynesian models of the business cycle ha.vc tried to mod(d price rigidi­
ties consistent with fully rational optjmizing behaviour and focus on the 
effects of ridigitics on the fluctuations of the economy. Iflielps and Tayh 
(1977) followed by McCallum (1977,1986), opiuKul tlui road for this apinoacl 
The material costs of price adjustment due to uiia,ntic.ii)at(!(l shocks arc; i(!f- 
ered to as ‘menu costs’'* and Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b), Mankiw (1985)
and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) find significant ex])lanatory power of the
■^ Defina(1991), pp. 411-412.
^Sheshinski and Weiss (1977)
'‘A tenn introduced by Shehinski and Weiss (1977)
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menu costs in the theory of business cycles. As Mankiw (1985) and Blan­
chard and Kiyotaki (1987) conclude that the private costs of price rigidities 
may be small, but the associated social costs may be quite largci in numerical 
analyses. The analysis of menu costs typically proceed in a monoi)olistic or 
monopolistically competitive framework. Caplin and Spull)or (1987) show 
that the price stickiness and the nonneutrality results disapi)ear in tlu; ag­
gregate if firms follow (s,S) pricing strategies. Caminal (1992) proves the 
oiAimality of (s,S) pricing strategies under quite general conditions. Lucke 
(1995) argues that Caplin and Spulber’s result requires tin; slightly rcistric- 
tive assumption of a rnonotonically increasing money supply, while the New 
Keynesian theory of menu costs is intended to cover both positive and nega­
tive demand shocks, possibly in a random sequence. Moreover, adjustments 
costs in cases of demand shocks also include costs of changes in input and 
output quantities in addition to the menu costs.
Lucke (1995) considers the partial eciuilibriurn model of Mankiw (1985), 
and treats the menu costs in the original set-up. The purpose of the study is 
to show that the spectacular property of large social externalities induced by 
small private costs vanishes if factor adjustment costs are taken into account. 
He concludes that it is questionable to state that the small memi costs gener­
ate large busine.ss cycles. The result ])ertains to any kind of adjusi nn'iit costs 
against demand shocks, even when the demand does not follow a. monotiUK! 
l)attern as specified by Caplin and Spulber (1987). Danziger (1999) studies 
a dynamic economy with menu costs in a general eciuilibrium set-uj). He 
finds that the correlation between unanticipated movements in tin' pric(' in­
dex and in the aggregate output is always positive, contriulicting Caplin and
11
Leahy (1991, 1997) where price distribution, and thus the history of monetary 
shocks, determines the consequences of monetary surprises.
2.1.2 State-Dependent Pricing
yVmong the vast amount of research focusing on tlie effects of microeconomic 
frictions on the macroeconomic dynamics, a main focus has been on the (s,S) 
models initially presented by Arrow, Harris and Marshak (1951). State de­
pendence of individual decisions becomes the distinguishing feature of this 
line of research. Agents act when a state variable crosses some critical thrcish- 
old so that the costs and benefits of adjustment are balanced. Blinder (1981), 
Caplin (1985), Mosser (1991) in the context of inventory dynamics. Caplin 
and Spulber (1987), Cabellero and Engel (1991,1993) and Caplin and Leahy 
(1991) in the context of prices; and by Bertola and Caballero (1990), Ca­
bellero (1993), and Eberly (1994) in the context of consumer dural)les, anal­
yse the implications of such microeconomic specification on the aggregates 
of the economy. Caplin and Leahy (1997) state that one of tlui most limiting 
aspects of these models is that they focus exclusively on the impact that 
microeconomic inertia has on the aggregate dynamics, ignoring thii feedback 
from the aggregates onto individual behaviour. Cai)lin and Li'ahy (1997) 
exainine the feedback effects with a hybrid of fixed and flexibh; pric(! models. 
They model the aggregate price level to have an independent effect on firms’ 
profitability. When aggregate demand has an increasing trend for a certain 
period of time, the price level becomes flexible in the inflationary direction. 
If aggregate demand is falling, the price level becomes flexible in tin; defla-
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tioiiary direction. Each firms pricing decision affects the i)ricing decisions of 
others if tlie fcedl:)ack effects are considered. The way in which tlie decisions 
interact is captured by the degree of strategic complementarity in i r^ice set­
ting. They show tliat increases in the degree of strategic comirlemcntarity 
increasii the range of output fluctuations and decrease the siz(i of firms’ price 
adjusl.ments. This contradicts Ball and Römer (1990) where all firms change 
[)rices at the sanu! time. In Caplin and Leahy (1997), the price changes are 
staggered. They also show that an incr(!ase in the variance of money supply 
reduces the slojrn of the Phillips curve as in the irnp(iifect information model 
of Lucas (1973).
Conlon and Liu (1997) present a generalized (s,S) state-dependent pricing 
model in which menus are changed, not just in response to price misalign­
ment, but also in response to factors such as changing ])roduct mix. The 
model generates aggregate price inertia, and so reverses an important ear­
lier result on neutrality in state-dependent pricing contexts in more gimeral 
settings than previous modifications. It also provides a compromise between 
state- and time-dependent rules gives a glimpse at the dynamic implications 
of menu-cost models, and reproduces two recent results; one on Phillips cnrv(i 
slopes, and one on asymmetric fluctuations. The model implies that, as the 
underlying inflation rises, inertia falls and the Phillips curve' Ix'coiik's ste'c'pi'r, 
confirming an imi)ortant reisult by Ball et al. (1988). Also, tluiy state; that 
under positive inflation, accelerations in aggregate demand have smallen· ef­
fects on output than decelerations, supporting results of Tsiddon (1993), anel 
Hall and Mankiw (1994).
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2.1.3 Limited Participation and Cash-in-Advance Mod­
els
Monetary economics conventionally argues that an expansionary moiuitary 
I)olicy generates a short-term decrease in nominal interest rates and an in­
crease in the level of output. Recently, Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992) show 
how this outcome is likely in a monetary model with a cash-in-advance con­
straint if there is ‘ limited participation’ in financial markets in response to 
shocks, basing their discussion on the ideas of Grossman and Weiss (1983). 
‘Limited Particii>ation’ is sometimes named as portfolio rigidity, meaning 
that firms and financial intermediaries adjust their financial jrositions more 
frequently than do the households. Therefore, firms and financial intininedi- 
aries face the undesirable consequences of unanticipated demand shocks first. 
This implies that expansionary monetary shocks product! a downward ))res- 
sure on nominal interest rates by raising the amount of loanable funds that 
banks have available for lending to firms, thereby leading to an increasci in 
the real economic activity. In the context of the Luca.s-Fu(!rst fram(iwork,by 
Christiano (1991) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a,b),the licpiidity 
effect is illustrated in computational general eciuilibrium models. Yet, tlui 
liquidity effect is not explained solely by the limited i)articipation assuin])- 
tion. Recent econometric literature, including Bernanke and Blimhu' (1992) 
and Cristiano and Eichenbaum (1991) provides enqnrica.1 (widence in su[)port 
of the existence of a liquidity effect. Cooley and Nam (1998) point out that 
anticipated inffation effects associated with a money siqiply shock have tlie 
potential to outweigh the liquidity effect in equilibrium. Nason and Cogiey
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(1994) present cases of failure to identify a liquidity effect despite the limited 
participation assumption.
Lucas-Fuerst style limited participation in a cash-in-advance model does 
not produce significantly different behaviour of the output resi)onses to a 
money supply shock, than the pure cash-in-advance model with fidl-participation. 
Christiano (1991) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a) in addition, as­
sume that capital also adjusts sluggishly, and Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992b) assume that production is inflexible in order to produce a licjuidity 
effect. The quantitative models above do not produce persistent liciuidity 
effects. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a) add the additional assumption 
that there are significant adjustment costs in order to get a more persistent
response of output to monetary shocks. A related paper by Euerst (.ex­
tends the limited participation assumption by incori)orating a real financial 
sector to the Christiano and Eichenbaum monetary model. Fisher (1994) also 
examines the monetary transmission mechanism in a model which incori)o- 
rates credit market imperfections and limited participation. In the framework 
of a standard RBC , Cooley and Narn (1998) include a.symmetric informa­
tion and limited participation in their rnochd. The standard R13C model has 
not been successful in producing a propagation mechanism for shocks, like; 
monetary shocks, that are not inherently i)ersistcnt. Cooh'y and Nam (1998) 
conclude that a j)Ositive money supply shock gemuates a (hicreasc; in nominal 
interest rates and an increase in output, while the asymni(itri(( information 
structure does not amplify or propagate the monetary shocks.
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2.2 On Evolutionary Approach and Replica­
tor Dynamics
In this soction, we will take a diversion to the evolutionary game theory and 
related learning literature. In the subseciuent chapters, we will use a similar 
model to generate a Phillips curve. A full introduction and an oven view of 
the literatiu'(! can be found in Weibull (1997). The evolutionary apinoach 
assumes a game in question is played repeatedly many times by boundedly ra­
tional players who are randomly drawn from large populations and who have 
little or no information about the game. The agents are Iroundedly rational 
and not perfectly coordinated. The general characteristics of an evolutionary 
model is governed by the selection and the mutation dynamics. The scdec- 
tion process favours some of the varieties over the others and the mutation 
process creates the varieties, which are actually the strategiiis in a ganui. In 
a market, the basic selection mechanism is the economic survival, and the 
mutation process is experimentation, innovation and mistakes. Mainly, the 
evolutionary approach focuses on how the population distribution of decision 
rules or strategies behaves over time.
Evolutionary exi)lanations have been considered by social scient ists even 
before Darwin. VVeibull (1997) points out that Malthus, Marshall, Schum­
peter, Hayek, and Adam Smith have evolutionary perpiudives in some their 
writings. In the context oi game theory, John Nash introduced the intepre- 
tation of ‘mass action interpretation’ . Agents gather emprical information 
on the relative advantages of the various pure strategies at their disposal.
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Evolutioriai'3' game theory incorporates the concepts of Evolutionary Sta­
bility and Replicator Dynamics. The concept of an evolutionarily stable 
strategy is dne to Maynard Smith and Price (1973), and also Maynard Smith 
(197-1, 1982). Such a strategy becomes robust to evolutionary processes such 
that a population playing such a strategy becomes uninvadable by any other 
strategy. Yet, it docis not explain how a population arrives at that strategy. 
I'he replicator dynamics, naimily the time derivative of the freciuency of a 
strategy being c(iual to the stratcigy’s relative ex[)ect('.d payolf, d(^scril)(is the 
selection process, specifiying how population shares associated with differ­
ent pure strategies evolve over time, the mathematical formulation of which 
is due to Taylor and .Jonker (1978). The selection dynamics are treated in 
two categories: payoff-positive selection dynamics where all pure strategies 
that perform better than the average payoff have positive growth rates and 
all pure strategies that perform worse obtain negative growth rat('s; weakly 
payoff- positive selection dynamics where at least some pnrci strategy that 
performs better than average, granted that such a strategy exists, has a pos­
itive growth rate. Literature on the evolutionary approach in game theory is 
vast. Binrnore and Sarnuelson (1994) discuss the evolution of norms, iden­
tifying the concept with the equilibrium selection problem in game theory 
and provide an example on the Ultimatum Game. They stress that adopting 
an evolutionary ajoproach may induce the economists abandon tlui literat.nr(i 
on refinements of Nash equilibrium. Bicchieri et al. (1997) also consider 
the dynamical processes responsible for establishment, maintenancci, meta­
morphosis, and dissolution of norms. Redondo (1995) and Wiebull (1995) 
provide source books on evolutionary game tlieoiy.
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Recent studies have shown that replicator dynamics may result from 
learning models of the two categories: reinforcement learning (Börgers and 
Sarin, 1997) and learning by imitation (Schlag 1997). Bush and Mosteller 
(1951,1955) and Estes (1950) investigate reinforcement learning in the con­
text of psychology, followed by Lieberrnan (1993) and Walker (1995) re­
cently. Cross (1973, 1979), Roth and Erev (1995), Brirgers and Sarin (1997), 
Mookherjee and Sopher (1997), Erev and Roth (1998) and Erev and Rapoport 
(1998) analyze reinforcement learning in repeated decision cnvironnKuits.
Börgers and Sarin (1997) compare Cross’ (1973) version of Bush’s and 
Mosteller’s (1951) model with the Taylor two-population dynamics, and con­
clude that over bounded time intervals, the reinforcement learning process 
is approximated by the replicator dynamics and there exists a close analogy 
in between the two. Hoirkins (1999), in a large population where agents 
are repeatedly drawn and randomly matched, states that the aggregation 
of the reinforcement learning behaviour yields an aggregate dynamic which 
belongs to the same class of several ibrmulations of evolutionary dynamics. 
Schlag (1997) in a set-up where individuals in a finite population rc])eatedly 
choose among actions yielding uncertain payofis, restricts his search to h'arn- 
ing rules with limited memory that increase exjrected payoffs regardh'ss of 
the distribution underlying their realizations. Between choice's, individual 
observes the action and realized payofl of one other individual. It is shown 
that the rule that outperforms all others is that which imitates the action of 
an observed individual whose realized outcome is better than herself, with a 
probability proportional to the difference in these realizations. When each 
individual uses this best rule, the aggregate population dynamic is approx-
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imatecl by the replicator dynamic. Dawid (1999) also concluded that the 
evolution of the population strategy is described by the replicator dynamics 
for an imitation type learning rule.
This thesis incorporates the concept of the replicator dynamics to (Udine 
the rule of how firms evolve over time with resj^ect to tin; pricing strate­
gies. We consider the firms as boundedly rational players who are a])t t.o 
make mistakes. Consumers face a cash-in-advance constraint and total con­
sumption spending is is symmetrically affected by changers in growth rate; of 
money siprply. Using a discrete price set, we introduce heterogeiuiity of firm 
behaviour in a single homogenous good market. The contribution of this 
study is that the microeconomic frictions inherent in the replicator dynamics 
model induce a Phillips curve relationship on the macroeconomic UiveT
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Chapter 3
The Model
Wo consider a society composed of a coiitimmm of firms and an arbitrary 
nonempty set of consnmers. Supply of money is stochastic. We assume that 
consumers face a cash-in-advance constraint and we simulate the (economy 
such that at discrete time intervals, firms’ sui)ply is purchased with all the 
money that the consumers hold. Firms pursue different strategies in terms of 
their pricing decisions and consumers spend all the money they hold as lorig­
as supply is available. The state of the world is given by the distribution 
of the firms over the iiricing strategies at time t. The pricing stratc'gies 
of the firms vary, depending on their inflation expectations. firm’s type' 
is determined by its inflation expectation. Therefore, tlu' set of tyiies is 
identified and kept constant throughout a given period. Poimlation dmisity 
of each type evolves over time. Firms are boundedly rational and are apt to 
make mistakes. At each state of the world, when firms are to update their
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beliefs about next period’s inflation, a certain proportion of the firms of each 
type pick a random pricing strategy regardless of their payoffs. Firms evolve 
according to a r(hnforcement learning rule. They observe; their own payoff 
as well as the average payoff of the society at each state. Consumers always 
remain rational in the sense that they spend all their money starting from 
the least expensive option until either supply or demand is exhausted. The 
demand of the consumers is characterized by the total moiuiy sup[)ly. VVe 
let the firms play the game for a large number of finitely many periods. The 
initial condition for the state of the world is giv(;n.
Introducing the notation will facilitate the illustration of the model in a 
detailed and formal manner. The number of types of firms is given by N, 
which represents the number of pure strategies of pricing decisions. Tin; firms 
are indexed by i, and di^ t represents the population density of firms with i)ure 
strategy i in period t. T is the total number of time periods. Monc'y growth 
rate is normally distributed around the mean /i with the standard deviation 
o. ¡It denotes the money growth rate in ])eriod t. Therefore the total money 
supply in period t is given by
Ml — Mi-\ · (1  +  /¿i)
A firm of type i has the inflation strategy of Given the i)revious period’s
aggregate price leveF, Pi_i, the nominal supply of firms of tyi)e i in peuiod 
^This price  index consists o f  a w eighted average o f  all firm s’ prices, w eights hcniig eijual 
to  density  o f  g o o d s  sold
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t, S i t, equals
Si,i =  ^ /.-1  ■ (1 +  Tr'-'i) · di^ t
Taking the total inoiiey supply Mi as the amount of total demand of the 
consumers at period t, the real profit‘d of a single type i firm in period t, R i,
IS
=  <
(l +  TT^ ) 
0
if Ml -  E t i  > s,t 
i f  M t -  J 2 [rJ i{S k ,i) <  0
I  -----— — otherwiseSt.t
Distinguishing between profits vs perceived payoffs, the lattc'r is  g iv e n  b y
Uг ,t =  -  1
where 7  > 0 is a “responsiveness” parameter.
The firms observe their own payoffs in addition to the averagxi payoff in 
the society, Ut. Actually they observe
N
= E
j=^
the weighted average of increasing functions of real profits wliich (Kiiial zero 
in case lli^ t is zero. With this set of information, the population density of
each type of firms are uptaded according to the replicator dynamic
^Real profit is m easured in term s o f  previous p e r io d ’s g o o d s . N ote  tliat tlie iiroductio ii 
costs  are taken as zero up to  a capacity  o f  one units.
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The above equation defines how the distribution of tlie iiriris (;volves over 
time. The parameters \ — 5 and 7  refer to the mistake level and r(!sponsive- 
ness parameter resixictively. A 5 of less than T imposes the a,ssnmption that 
a certain share of population make mistakes which are nniforml}^ distributed 
over possible strategies. Thus, even when zero payoff is observed for a pricing 
strategy, some of the firms keep following it in the following period. On the 
other hand, 7 , which is identical for each type of firms, is a parameter of the 
learning ability of the firms. Intuitively, higher values of 7  mak(;s perccnved 
payoffss more pronounced and hence leads to a society of quicker learners as 
a whole. In order to observe how inflation behaves in the duration of simu­
lation, we find the aggregate price level in period t as the weighted averagi! 
of the i)rices of the firms who were able to sell any positive amount in that 
period.
N
Pi =  Pt-l l
¿=1
Our definition of the weights, given below, makes tin; above (Hiuation a 
weighted average of the j)rices of only the selling firms, d'he mod('l imi)li('s 
that di^ u file density of the type i firms, corresponds to the (piantity supi)li(>d 
by type i firms at +T^ '^ i)· Then, recalling the formulation for the
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quantity sold by type i firms at Pi_i(l +  Tr'y) is given by
 ^ <kl. i fw ,
< 0 if M i - E r J i K a  < 0
(¡. . . Yl-Y'kYVYf··:"'Oi .S',, — otherwise
In order to determiiHi the weights of the goods sold at /;, we normaliz(i the ;;q j 
figures to derive the percentage of goods sold l)y type i firms at P/._i(l + 7r'·,;). 
The normalized sales are given by
L·k=ı
so that the price index consists of a weighted average of all selling firms 
prices. Then, given the aggregate price level, and the updated distribution 
of firms over the inflation strategies, the new supplies of (!a,ch type; of firms 
are determined. What rimiains is the calculation of tlui inflation obscn vc'd in 
period t,
TTi = Pt -  Pt-v
P>l-[
The next liguie that wc will be locusing attention on is tluî nsd out])ut 
1(!V(!İ in (!a.ch p(',riod /-, so that w(! will b(i analysing tlui r('lat,ion b('(w('('u in- 
llation and real output in our set-up. Real output lev(d, Y, is giv(m by
N
i= l
i.e. the sum of quantities sold by each type of firms. It is implicitly assumed
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that the iriaxiiiiuin capacity of real output is constant and equals 1 so t hat the 
above equation gives a consistent measure of real output. Full employment 
level therefore corr(;sponds to the case of aggregate real output being equal 
to 1. Thus, the real output level directly reflects the {'.mployment level in 
our economy. The ladiaviour of the economy will be observed over time for a 
duration of T periods. The first question is whether there exists a convergence 
to stationary state of the economy. If so, the relation between inflation and 
real output will be (ixamined, (luestioning the presence of a Phillips curv(! tyi)e 
linkage. The slope of a possible Phillips curve will be investigated. Moreover, 
the effects of mean and standard deviation of growth rate of money, mistake 
level, and responsiveness parameter on the stationary state will b(i analyscxl.
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Chapter 4
Results
4.1 The Stationary State and The Irrelevance 
of The Initial Distribution
We simulate the model using Microsoft Excel Workbook facilities. We take 
T=5000 as for the duration of the simulation. The game is played ixipcatcdly 
T times, firms updating their beliefs at each stage and determining their 
prices according to the dynamics explicitly described in the i)revious chaptc'r. 
Our initial concern is whether the model reacluis a stationary state; at souk! 
period during the whole duration. We initially divide the whole period into 
two and observe the standard deviations of the distribution of firms over 
the strategies in the second half, T. Throughout the whole analysis, we 
take N —20, such that the strategy space of the firms include 20 distinct
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strategies, tt'^ / ranging from a deflation rate of -0.05 to an inflation rate of 
0.14, incremented by 0 .0 1 . Initial money supply, A/q equals 1 0 0  while the 
initial price level, Po is <dso 100.
In Table 1 , for money growth rate,/i= 0, mistake level, l-(5= 0.05, re­
sponsiveness level, 7=1, and initial densities, di i^= 0.05 for all i =  1,2,..., N, 
for different values of standard deviation of money growth, a, the standard 
deviations and means of densities are prcisented for T only. Obscn ving the 
considerably small figures of standard deviations in T, for different valnes of 
(j, the standard deviation of the money growth rate, we conclnde that it is 
appropriate to investigate the relationship between the money growth rate 
and real output during T where a stationary behaviour has be(ui ixiacluKl. 
For a ranging from 0.0001 to 0.001, we observe that the standard deviations 
of the densities remain in the order of maximum 1 0 ~ * for a = 0 .0 0 0 1 .
At the bottom of Table 1 , for T, which we identify as Ireing at the sta.tion- 
ary state, the mean and standard deviation of the inflation and real output 
figures are also reported. Given the other parameters, w(! observe! variation 
in the order of 1 0 “ '' for the real output figures and the standard d(!via.tion of 
the inflation at the stationaiy state for <7=0.0001, wluire tlu! mean of infla­
tion at the stationary state remains unaffected as a is increasc'd. In the last 
line, the “Slope” item gives the slope of the line wh(!n the inflation is ])lotted 
against the real output figures during T. The slope of the line is caladatc'd 
by least squares method for the regression
7/ =  /3x· +  a
where 'i/’s are the realized values for inflation and .x’s are the realized valnes
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for real output at each t in T. Table 2 suininarizes the results of the nigrcs- 
siori for different ¡i. For negative values of ¡i, the slope happens to be very 
close to 0, yet statistically insignificant for the case of ¿=0.95. Still, for non- 
negative values of nician of money growth rate, slope becomes always positive 
and statistically significant. Besides, the coefficient of real output, namely 
the slope increases as /i is increased. Table 4 reports regression ixisults for 
different 5 values. It is observed that as the mistake level is increased in the 
economy, the slope becomes always positive and statistically significant ev(!ti 
for negative rates of money growth. Besides, higher slo])e is ol)S(!rved in case 
of higher mistake level for firms. In Figure 1 , data is plotted for inflation and 
the aggregate price level for the whole period. Increasing the volatility in the 
mean of money growth rate, the behaviour of the economy is illustrated in 
Figures 1.1 and 1 .2 . Volatility of inflation increases and the aggregate price 
level departs from the initial level of 1 0 0 , implying rigidities on tlui aggregate. 
As Hallman et al. (1991) pointed out, accumulative effects of money stock 
do eventually show up in the price level'.
In Figures 2 and 3, the graphs illustrating how inflation and aggregate! 
price level behave throughout the period are presented for dillerent spcicifica- 
tions of initial distribution of firms over strategies. The initial distribution is 
changed such that for Figure 2 , d|_o=l and d,;,o=0 for V/ 1 difh're'iit tlian 1 .
In Figure 3, the initial distribution is specified such that i/|,o=0.()l, ^7,0= 0 .02, 
^3,0=0.03, ii4,o=0.01, 4.0=0.05, 4,o=0.06, 4,o=0.07, 4,o=0.08, 4,o=0-09,
(¿10,0= 0 . 10 , (¿110—0 .0 9 ,  (¿1 2 .0 = 0 .0 8 , (¿ i3 .o = 0 .0 7 ,  (¿14.0= 0 .0 6 , (¿ i5. o = 0 .0o ,  (¿io.o=0.04, 
^A nother m a jor  p o in t o f  H allm an ot al. (1991) is that an increase in m on ey  su])ply will 
a ffect future in flation  as long as there exists excess i)ro(h ictive  ca p a city  in the (iconoiny.
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cA7,o= 0-03, f/i8,o=0 .0 2 , c/ i9_o= 0.005, <i2o,o=(^ ’005, approximating a iionnal dis­
tribution around tlio mean Tri'Q. For the diiihrcnt specifications of initial dis­
tributions, the graphs iini)ly no difference in the stationary state behaviour. 
In Tabl(! 3, tlie set of data for the standard deviation and means of densities, 
inflation and real output at stationary state and the slope; of the stationary 
state inflation- r(;al output figures are presented. The findings ini])ly that 
the initial distrilrution of the firms over the strategi(;s is irredevant to the; 
behaviour at the stationary state.
It is observed that, the favourite strategy at the stal,ionary state , btdongs 
to a pricing decision higher than the mean of money growth rate for i=0.95. 
The mean of inflation at stationary state appears to be equal to the mean 
of money growth rate on the other hand. Identifying the; total sui)i)ly and 
total demand satisfied, the economy is characterised t)y an exc(;ss su])ply 
equilibrium at the stationary state (Figures 5 to 8 ). For the extreme case of 
firms making no mistake at all, 6= 1 , the favourite strategy at the stationary 
state becomes 77«= 0 for the case of /r= 0  as is the case for 5— 0.99 (Figures 
9 and 10). Yet, mean of inflation at stationary state equals mean of money 
growth rate. With no mistakes, the economy oi)crates at the full em])loyment 
level. Bearing in mind that we allow for discrete pricing in our model, at the 
exce.ss supi)ly (Hiuilibrium at i=0.95, the highest ('(piilibrium prici' lu'conu's 
arbitrarily far from the competitive price, which has bcum illustratcxl for a 
finite number of players in a Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly s(!t-ui) by Dixon 
(1993).
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4.2 Effects of the Mean of Money Growth 
Rate
As tlie first question of our analysis, we investigatci the effects of tlu; lev('l 
of mean of money growth rate, /.i, on the variables such as the standard 
deviations and means of real output, Yj and inflation, 7T(, at tlu; stationary 
state. Besides, we observe the effects of the level of //. on the slojai of the 
Phillips Curve.
Initially, for 5= 0.90, 7=1, (7 = 0 .0 0 0 1  and uniform initial distril)ution, 
the graphs are presented in Figure 11. In this set up, for we performed 
successive simulations for ¡j, ranging from -0.05 to 0.07, incremented by 0.01. 
It is observed that for increasing p,, the mean of iidlation and real output 
at the stationary state increase, as presented in Phgures 1 1 .a. and 1 1.1). In 
an economy where surprises to the growth rate of money is small, as the 
sustained rate of growth of money gets higher, mean of real output in the 
stationary state increases while the inflation is also increased. The standard 
deviation of the real output has a decreasing trend, illustrated in Figure 
1 1 .dT
This observation leads us to locus on how the sloi)(! of the Phillii)s curv(i
is affected by the level of money growth rate. Figure ll.c . shows that tlu' 
^Feldstein and S tock  (1994) and Hall and M ankiw  (1994 ), in their recent con tribu tion  to 
the literature on  N om inal G N P  targettin g  con clu d e  that better system atic  j)olicies reduce 
the Vciriance o f  ou tpu t. O bserve that, here, a  gets relatively  sm alh 'r as fi is incii'ased , 
im p ly in g  less u ncerta in ty  in the m oney supply  in relative term s.
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slo])c increases as //, increases. This behaviour is in line witli Conlon and Liu 
(1998) and Ball et ah (1988) who argue in the context of their model that 
higher inflation causes more frequent price chang(!s, imi)lying hiss nominal 
rigidity, therefore nominal shocks have smaller effectsL
As the sustained growth rate of money is increased, (h'creasing the infla­
tion becomes less costly in the sense that less output has to be sacrificed to 
reduce inflation by one unit. Therefore, in our economy of learning firms, the 
output effect will be le.ss when inflation is reduced marginally in case of high 
initial level of inflation. On the overall, this set of simnlations im])ly that, 
higher the mean of growth rate of money supply, higher is the mean of infla­
tion in the stationary state, less costly it is to reduce inflation marginally, in 
terms of real output. The decreasing standard deviation of real outi)nt, may 
be explained through the dynamics of firms in updating their beliefs.
Figures 5 to 8 illustrate the effect of the mean of money growth rate 
on the distribution of firms over the strategies at the stationary state. As 
/j gets higher, the strategy attracting the biggest share of the ¡)0 ])ulation, 
the marginal strategy, belongs to a higher pricing decision. However, the 
densities get more distributed over the smaller pricing strategies.
Analy/ing th(i Figures 5.d. to 8 .d., it is observixl that the (iconomy ex­
periences an excess supply equilibrium at the stationary static The demand 
met by the highest pricing firms who sell a positive amount is always below
what they supply in each period. The model suggests that, when demand is 
^ E m prica lly  reexam ined  by  D efina (1991).
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less than supply, the losers will Ire the firnis who inake the highest pricing 
decisions and therefore they will realize lower payoffs. Through the rcijrlicator 
dynamics, the population densities of these linns will lu' less and less and 
the firnis cluster around the eciuilibriurn strategy i, defined as the strategy 
chosen by the largcrst share of the population, i.e the marginal firnis, which in 
all simulations appear to be a strategy of pricing higher than //,. The higher 
pricers will be represented by a very small share of the population and there­
fore the effect on the real output will be less reflected since the variation in 
the demand will mainly affect the highest pricing firms'*.
As the last step of the analysis of the effects of mean of money growth 
rate, we introduce stepwise jumps in /r in every 1 0 0 0  successive periods. 
In Figure 1 2 , f.i is reduced from 0.04 to -0.04, by steps of 0 .0 2 . Plotting- 
inflation versus real output for the whole duration, we observe that the mean 
of real output at stationary state at different inflation rates is reduced while 
eliminating inflation. Slope at stationary state is decreased, positive for all //., 
and statistically significant for all nonnegativc In Figure 13, we initially 
decrease the rate of deflation and later increase the rate of inflation. Tlu; 
mean of real output at each stationary state is increasedb Also, during 
transition, introducing inflation increases real output uj) to a certain levcd.
Conseiiutively, a period of stagflation follows*’. As //, gi'.ts higher, ('conomy 
■'Karras and Stokes (1909) show , in an einprical study, that asyinnuitry in tin; (iffects
o f  m on ey  supply  shocks is intensified by increases in tlie rate o f  in flation .
'’ C aplin  and Leahy (1991) poin t ou t that m on etary  expan sion  is m ore eflective  in ex ­
pan d in g  o u tp u t when ou tp u t is currently  low .
®Shi (1998) exam ines a m on etary  prop a ga tion  m echanism  w here tran sactions in g ood s
and la b ou r m arket involves costly  search and con clu des that an increase in the m oney
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comes closer to the full-ernployrnent level. Keeping /i constant, when firms 
are bound to rriakci more mistakes, the stationary state real output, level is 
reduced (Figures 14 and 15). On the other hand, as summarized in Table 
4, the slope at each stationary state is increased when 5 is reduced. Im]fiied 
is that it is less costly to reduce inflation rnarginaly if initial inflation is 
already high given 5, the mistake level fixed. Keeping /i constant, it is less 
costly if firms are apt to make more mistakes when the mean of real output 
at stationary state is also reduced. Higher mistakes lead to more cai)acity 
wasted awaiting customeres at high price levels. Higher inllation hwel reduccis 
this waste in productive resources.
4.3 Effects of the Volatility of Money Growth 
Rate
The standard deviation of the money growth rate, a appears to be one of the 
fundamental determinants for the behaviour of our economy. The h'arning 
firms resj)ond to th(! changes in demand, therefore, it is not ])os.siI)i(' to idcni- 
tify a stationary state in terms of a deterministic distribution of firms over the 
pricing strategies when a is very high. In Figun; 1 .2 , for A^=2 0 , //.^O,;') -4).9o, 
7 = 1  and uniform initial distribution, the behaviour of the ('conomy is prc!-
sented f o r  the case o f  cr='0.005, identifying a high uncertainty in  th e  supply 
grow th  rate increases steady state em ploym ent and o u tp u t when the m on ey  grow tli rate is 
low , bu t reduces steady  state em i)Ioym ent and o u tp u t wh(;n m on ey  grow th  ratci is already 
high.
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of money, the demand of the consumers, in other terms. Despite the volatil­
ity in inflation (Figure 1.2.a.), we observe that from approximately ¿==1500 
onwards, the economy experiences a convergence in the aggregate price level 
of around 80 (Figure 1 .2 .b.) a.nd a positive relation between inflation and 
real output during T is observed (Figure 16) with a positive slope of 0.0582. 
The mean of the densities at the stationary state are given in F'igurci 16.a. 
Figures 17 and 18 are for lower values of a in our model. For a=0.001 and 
0.0005, the standard deviation of the distribution of firms ovc'r the strategFis 
becomes sufficiently small so that we can identify that the economy reaches 
a stationary state.
Keeping in mind the deterring effect of very high rates of a, an analysis is 
performed to identify the effects of the level of a on the mean of inflation and 
real output figures and the slope of tlie phillips curve. A set of simulations 
is carried out, increasing a from 0.000001 to 0.03 and the outcomes are 
presented in Figure 19. Figure 19.a., illustrates tliat the mean of real out])ut 
follows a decreasing trend as tlie volatility in the money supidy increas(!s. In 
Figure 19.c. and 19.d., we observe that volatility in real output and inflation 
increase as a is increased. Firms respond to the changing demand as the 
model suggests, however, inflation varies around the mean //,=() as expectcid.
Therefore, focusing on the slo])e of the Phillips curve, a.n increasing trend 
is recognized. Increasing uncertainty in the economy, whih; firms arc; learning 
according to a replicator dynamics with a certain mistake hivel, increases tin;
slope, having diminishing adverse real effects of eliminating inflatioiA (Figure 
^Ball et a l. ’s (1988) second  m a jor  finding was that nom inal shocks liavc sm aller real
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19.b.). A.S a result, increasing the uncertainty in the money su])ply, leads to 
lower levels of real output and higher slopes of the Phillii)s curve!.
In such a set up, the question is whether we can explain such a behaviour 
depending on the specified replicator dynamics. Again, the highest pricing 
(inns will be affected most by the changes in aggregate demand. Given the 
mean of the money growth rate, large changes in the d(!mand will aflect tlu! 
population density of the firms, the marginal firms, who concimtiate around 
the “on average” optimal strategy profiles. In an economy with high uncer­
tainty, the share of firms pricing higher than the marginal firms hav(! great(!r 
densities than the case of smaller uncertainty. This means the pr(!s(!iice of a 
bigger share of idle capacity, and thus, the mean of real output in the sta­
tionary state is decreased. Besides, higher volatility decreases tin! r(!al costs 
of reducing inflation. Focusing on Figures 16 to 18, increasing the volatil­
ity, causes the excess supply equilibrium to appear such that, the unsatisfied 
demand belongs to the firms who make higher pricing decisions that the 
marginal firms at the stationary state. Since the marginal firm is setting a 
relatively higher price, a reduction in total nominal demand will show itself 
more on the inflation rate and less on output.
4.4 Effects of Firms’ Mistake Level
Introducing the mistake level in our model imposes the assumption that the
boundedly rational firms are also apt to make mistakes which we take as 
effects as the variance o f  aggregate shocks trends higher.
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uniformly distributed over the strategies. Tliis proportion is (ixogenously de­
termined by setting a value for 6 and for each strategy, — of individuals 
choose the strategy i V i For any (5 < 1 , the state of the economy is not fully 
determined according the replicator dynamic. Figures 20 l,o 22 summarizes 
the; effects of firms’ mistake level on the stationary state densiti(!s and how 
the excess supply equilibrium is realized in each case. To analyze the (dfects 
of ¿ on tlui stationary state l)ehaviour of the economy, we carry out tin; third 
set of simulations for different values of i, ranging from O.G to 1 stich that 
a total of 26 runs are taken keeping 7=1, (7 = 0 .0 0 0 1 , //.=0 and the initial 
distribution uniform. The standard deviation of the inflation follows a as ex­
pected. The aggregate price level remains around 1 0 0 . In the second half of 
the whole duration, the inflation-real output relation appears to be positiv(! 
and linear. In Figure 23 , findings of this set of simulations are graphed.
As reported in F’igure 23.a., the slope of the Phillips curve declines as 6 is 
increased, in other words, when firms start making less mistakes and acenu; 
higher weight to their learning abilities. Then, firms which are learning from 
their previous payoffs, value their previous strategicis more and the stickiness 
of the aggregate price level is intensified. When firms become Ix’.tter hxirmirs 
and marginal prices settle down at a relatively low level, it beconi(!s more! 
costly, in terms of i(ial output, to reduce inflation marginally^, l-if can also 
be interpreted as a measure of cost of i)rice adjustment in our (iconomy. If
l -(5 is large, then mor(! of the firms pick randomly from the ])ricing strati'gy 
*Sachs (1980) identifies e inprica lly  that sloj)e o f  the P hillips curve dim inishes after 
W orld  W ar II, one o f  the m ain reasons o f  th is, he argues is lon g -term  w age con tracts ; 
increased  rigidities in the econom y.
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set, implied is that costs of adjustment are less. As 1-5 gets smaller, costs of 
adjustments increase and firms update their prices less freely. Then, in a more 
“responsive” economy which learns from previous experiences, a marginal 
decreas(' in inflation leads to higher real output losses.
However, we also observe that the mean of real output increases as l-fi is 
decreased (Figure 23.b.). This implies that a right shift in the Phillips curve 
is experienced in addition to a decrease in its slope. It is quite intuitive 
since, the firms reach the equilibrium pricing strategy profile determined 
at the stationary state which is usually skewed towards a favorite; pricing- 
strategy, a marginal strategy, higher than the mean of money growth rate. 
The strategies of higher pricing decisions above the marginal strat<;gy attract 
much smaller population densities. Decreasing the mistake level, caus(;s a 
higher share of population to be pursuing the marginal strategy, less will 
be announcing low(;r price changes and the real effect on the output will be 
positive therefore.
As illustrated in the Figures 20 to 22, as 1-5 get higher, the marginal 
strategy at the equilibrium belongs to a higher pricing decision, and the 
distribution gets more spread over to the smaller pricing strategies while 
a small constant proportion remains for the high(;r ones. Decreasing 1-5, 
the distribution g(;ts more right-skewed at a lower marginal i)ricing strat(;gy. 
Then the increase in the weight of this equilibrium strat(;gy dominates the; 
effects of the other strategies in terms of participation in the real output 
figure and the real output increases. The effects on the mean of stationary 
state inflation are such that, while mistaking firms decrease or the costs of
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adjustment decrease, tlie mean of inflation remains around 0 . Better learners 
respond more to the changes in the money supply and the detaihid discussion 
on the responsiveiKîss parameter is carried to the next section.
4.5 Effects of The Responsiveness Parame­
ter
The responsiveness parameter, 7 , appears to be one of the determinants of 
the stationary state behaviour of the economy. Figurcis 24 to 25 illustrate 
the behaviour of the economy over time for different values of 7 , 0 .0 0 1  and 
10  while the other parameters are kept constant at ¡i— 0 , cr= 0 .0 0 0 1 , 5'=  0 .9 5  
and the initial distribution uniform. It is oUserved that the distribution of 
the firms over the strategies is dependent on 7  such that as 7  is increased, 
more firms concentrate on the marginal strategy. As 7  is decreased, the 
firms at stationary state are tilted towards the ones that suggest smaller 
prices than the marginal strategy. With higher resi)onsivencss parameter 
more firms converge to the marginal strategy. The story is summarized 
for the realizations of stationary state distributions and the excess supply 
eciuilibrium at the stationary state for various 7  in Figun; 24.b and 25.1). The 
distribution shifts hd't, getting more right-skewed towards a si.rategy higher 
that while the excess supply equilibrium is conserved. For 7 = 1 0 , the linns 
start responding abruptly to changes in nominal demand and as shown in 
Figure 25.b, the standard deviations become drastically high, i)revcnting us 
to identify a stationary state of the economy according to our definition of
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stationarity which requires statioiiarity in the distribution of firms over the 
strategy set. Figure 26 provides the behavior of the economy for such a case.
The effects of 7  on the stationary state behaviour is closely liidved to the; 
mistake; level in the economy. Stationarity may be reached for sufficiently 
small 5 given the r(;sponsiveness jjarameter. Figure 1.1 and 27 show how 6 
changes the effect of 7 . For decreased mistakes, the economy departs from the 
stationary state. In order to analyze the effects of 7 , we choose a high mistake 
level for firms. Performing succesive simulations, we observe that, increasing 
7  causes the mean level of real output to decrease at stationary state (Figure 
28). At this set-up, we have a very high mistake level. In Figure 29, a 
low mistake level is incorporated, resulting that increasing resj)onsiveness in 
such a set-up, increases the mean level of real output at stationary state;. 
With very high rigidity, responsiveness brings the economy closer to the fvdl- 
employrnent level. With very low rigidity (small costs of price changes), 
economy departs from the full-ernloyrnent level and the mean of real output 
is decreased as firms get more responsive. Increasing 7 , intensifies the (¡fleets 
of payoff realizations, and, therefore, increases the stickiness in prices. Figure 
28 shows the dirnishing slope of Philliiis Curve. This effect is a variant of 
the effect of decreasing the mistake level in the economy which meant higher 
dependence on ])revious experiences and therefore more rigidity in tl'.e price's.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
We studied an economy oi' boundedly rational firms that evolve through rcipli- 
cator dynamics with an exogenously determined mistake level, and nominal 
demand shocks characterized by the shocks to the mean of growth rate of 
money supply. The stock of money determines the nominal demand of the 
consumers who spend all the money they hold. In a given period t, the state? 
of the economy is described by the distribution of the firms over discrete ])i ic- 
ing decisions. We identify that the system reaches the stationary state* whe>re 
the standard deviations of the densities of firms over the strategie?s remain 
considerably small. It is shown that the initial distribution e>f the firms e)ver 
the strategies is irrelevant to the realized ditributie)n at the st;itie)nary state.
At stationary state, an excess supply equilibrium is maintained for suf­
ficiently small degrees of variability in the mean of money growth rate. At 
stationary state, a positive relation between inflation and real output bc;-
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comes apparent. That is, a Phillips curve type linkage is identified. The 
mean of inflation ecpials the mean of money growth rate at stationary state, 
while the favorite strategy at the equilibrium becomes that of increasing 
prices one percentage point higher than the mean of money growth rate.
The initial focus of the study is on the effect of the mean of money growth 
rate on the overall behaviour of the economy. Simulating economy for various 
values of /i, two major observations are made. First, higher is the mean of 
growth rate of money supply, /t, higher is the mean of inflation and real 
output at stationary state in line with Ball et al. (1988) and Defina (1991). 
High money growth and high accumulated money stock leads to high real 
activity in our set up. With respect to inflation, at stationary state, it is 
always the case that the inflation rate equals the mean of money growth 
rate. Second, higher the mean of growth rate of money supply, higher is 
the slope of the Phillips curve emerging in our economy. As the underlying 
inflation gets higher, it becomes less costly to reduce inflation marginaly as 
has also been stated by Defina (1991) and Conlon and Liu (1997). During 
transition, increasing money growth rate increases real outj)ut upto a c(;rtain 
level, followed by a period of stagflation as suggested by Shi (1998) recently.
The next major concern of the analysis is the effects of the volatility in 
the growth rate of money supply on the overall behaviour of the economy. 
In the current framework, in ca.ses of very high volatility, it becomes imi)os- 
sible to clarify a stationary state of the economy since the inflation and real 
output, also have a very volatile behaviour since firms respond to nominal 
shocks through replicator dynamics. Still, focusing on the aggregat(! price
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level, a rigidity is apparent for the case of ii—Q. Besides, the relation be­
tween inflation and real output also remains positive while a concentration 
at the fnll-employrnent level is observed. Carrying out the set of simulations 
for inci('asing values of a, we examine the effects of increasing volatility on 
the mean level of real output initially. As the monetary policy becomes more 
uncertain, the mean level of real output is decreased. The second major 
effect of high volatility is on the slope of the Phillips curve: high variance 
of aggregate shocks, lead to nominal shocks having smaller real effects. The 
Phillips curve gets steeper which has been emprically stated by Ball et al. 
(1988) who conclude that nominal shocks have smaller real (iffects as the ag­
gregate shocks trends higher. This results contradicts Lucas (1973) imperfect 
information model and Caplin and Leahy’s (1997) optimization model with 
state dependent pricing.
The mistake level, as an analogy to the imitation process in evolutionary 
approach, keeps track of the varieties in firms’ types in terms of the infla­
tion expectations. (1 — 5) * l/N of the population chooses the strategy i for 
i — Besides, this proportion can be interpreted as a measure of costs
of adjustment. Therefore, higher the mistake level, more of the firms are 
uniformly distributed over all the strategies. Simulating the economy succes­
sively for decreasing values of 1 —S, increasing costs of jnfcii adjustnu'ul, tlu’ 
mean of real outimt is increased. With less mistakes, the economy opinati's 
closer to the full-employment level. Besides, slope of the Phillips curve de­
clines. Had higher adjustment costs referred to less mistakes, more rigidity 
in nominal prices would be implied. Thus, eliminating inflation marginally, 
will lead to greater real outi)ut costs which has been emprically stated l)y
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Sachs (1980).
The final point worth mentioning about the implications of this model is 
on the effects of the responsiveness parameter, 7 . A higher value of 7  makes 
profits more pronounced in the perceived payoff figures and induces higher 
rigidity in the system. The slope of Phillips curve decrease as 7  is incr(;ased 
as is the case for deci(!asing the mistakci level. The last notable obscu vation 
is that, as the responsiveness parameter is increased, the mean level of real 
output is decreased, keeping the mistake level constant.
Introducing the replicator dynamics to determine the way firms evolve 
through time, we observe rigidities in the aggregate price level. A positive 
relation between real output and inflation is identifi(!cl. Further analysis 
may consider firms differentiated also with respect to their resi)on.siveiu'ss 
parameters. Thus, the performance of better learning strategies may be 
evaluated. In addition, consumers may be incorporated into the model as 
evolving individuals also. Then, the two populations which inherently learn 
from their experiences, may be allowed to coexist in this repeated decision 
environment. Controling for the extent of rigidities on both sides of tlu; 
economy, resulting eciuilibrium conditions may be analysed. The growth rat('. 
of money supply and the associated variance, r(!caliing that th('re may ('xist 
a correlation in between the two, may be endogenized. Given the firms and 
consumers behaviour, even the central bank may be modelled as an ('volving 
entity and the policy implications may be analysed.
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Table 1. Standard Deviation and Mean of Density o f Each Strategy at Stationary State Under Different Volatility
Mean of Money Growth Rate 0
(1-Mistake Level) 0.95
Responsiveness Parameter 1
Uniform Initial Distribution______________
Standard Deviation of Money 0.0001 0.0005 0.001 0.005 Strategies
7.6E-05 0.000387 0.00059 0.002659 -0.05 Standard Deviation
0.02724 0.027234 0.02735 0.028584 Mean
9.9E-05 0.000502 0.00077 0.003465 -0.04 Standard Deviation
0.03252 0.032504 0.03268 0.034464 Mean
0.00013 0.000679 0.00104 0.004761 -0.03 Standard Deviation
0.04042 0.040399 0.04067 0.043494 Mean
0.00019 0.000981 0.00152 0.007139 -0.02 Standard Deviation
0.05358 0.053534 0.05401 0.059122 Mean
0.00031 0.001597 0.00252 0.012655 -0.01 Standard Deviation
0.07983 0.079714 0.08076 0.092706 Mean
0.00069 0.003462 0.00582 0.034683 0 Standard Deviation
0.15797 0.157572 0.16149 0.216092 Mean
0.00147 0.00742 0.01102 0.066793 0.01 Standard Deviation
0.57593 0.5753 0.56577 0.424917 Mean
5.7E-10 0.004298 0.00913 0.031774 0.02 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.003729 0.00693 0.034192 Mean
5.7E-10 0.000156 0.00169 0.019754 0.03 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.002514 0.00284 0.018198 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 4.4E-05 0.015051 0.04 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.012592 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0.010645 0.05 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.008098 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0.006971 0.06 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.005278 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0.004408 0.07 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.003793 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0.002825 0.08 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.003056 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0.001677 0.09 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.002742 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0 000979 0.1 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.002615 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0.00055 0.11 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.002549 Mean
5.7E-I0 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 0.000121 0.12 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.002506 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 4.341L05 0.13 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.002501 Mean
5.7E-10 5.72E-10 5.7E-10 5.72E-10 0.14 Standard Deviation
0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 Mean
0.00034 0.001612 0.0031 0.013251 REAL OU'l'PU'l ' Standard Deviation
0.96599 0.966053 0.96616 0.964166 Mean
4.2E-05 0.000201 0.00042 0.002749 INFLATION Standard Deviation
2.4E-06 -1.9E-05 -4E-06 -1.4E-05 Mean
0.03547 0.043524 0.05182 0.057897 SLOPE
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Inilial Di.stribulion Unilbrni 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation of Money Growth Rate
0.95
1.00
0.0001
Table 2 . Regressions o f Inllation on Real Output at Stationary Sbite
Mean o f Money 
Growth Rate Adjusted R Square Observations
Coeilicients*
Intercept
CoeiTicienLs’*' 
Real Output l·’
-0.03 0.00 3501 -0.032 0.002 0 688
(-15.323) (0.829)
0 0.09 3501 -0.034 0.036 328..540
(-18.127) (18.126)
0.01 0.01 3501 -0.009 0.019 41.359
(-3.01) (6.431)
0.02 0.03 3501 -0.008 0.029 91 238
(-2.791) (9.552)
0.03 0.05 3501 -0.007 0 038 171.172
(-2.572) (13.083)
0.04 0.08 3501 -0.01 0.051 320.241
(-3.59) (17 89.5)
0.05 0.13 3501 -0.009 0.06 504.230
(-3.35) (22.455)
0.06 0.04 3501 0.015 0.046 151.611
(3.991) (12.313)
0.07 0.06 3501 0.016 0.055 236.704
(4.5) (15.385)
*: t-values in paranthesis.
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'I'ablc 3. Standard Deviation and Mean of Density of Finch Strategy at Stationary State Under Diil'erent Initial Distribution
Mean o f Money Growth Rate 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation o f Money Growth Rat
0
1
1
0
Strategies Distribution 0.05,0.05,0.05... 1,0,0,... 0,01,0,02,0,03,...
-0.05 Standard Deviation 8.15933E-05 9.26E-05 9.23E-05
Mean 0.027246538 0.02724 0.0272395
-0.04 Standard Deviation 0.000105225 0.00012 0.000119
Mean 0.032522202 0.032513 0.0325124
-0.03 Standard Deviation 0.000141433 0.000162 0.0001598
Mean 0.040429062 0.040414 0.0404144
-0.02 Standard Deviation 0.000202963 0.000234 0.0002285
Mean 0.053588702 0.053561 0.0535635
-0.01 Standard Deviation 0.000328647 0.000381 0.000367
Mean 0.079837102 0.079771 0.0797812
0 Standard Deviation 0.000716356 0.000832 0.000789
Mean 0.158007914 0.157735 0.1577813
0.01 Standard Deviation 0.0015365 0.001776 0.0017152
Mean 0.57586848 0.576266 0.5762077
0.02 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-I0 5.72E-10 5.7I8E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.03 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.718E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.04 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72FM0 5.718E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.05 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.718E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.06 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.718E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.07 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.7181--10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.08 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.718E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.09 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.718l>10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.1 Standard Deviation 5.7I835E-10 5.72E-10 5.718E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.11 Standard Deviation 5.71835F:-10 5.72E-10 5.718E-I0
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.12 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.7181·:-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.13 Standard Deviation 5.71835E-10 5.72E-10 5.718E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.14 Standard Deviation 5.7I835E-10 5.72E-10 5.7I8E-10
Mean 0.0025 0.0025 0.00^5
RLiAL OUTPUT Standard Deviation 0.000316993 0.00033 0.0003113
Mean 0.965989802 0.966001 0.9659904
INPLATION Standard Deviation 4.05697E-05 3.94E-05 3.772E-05
Mean -3.14587E-07 5.64E-06 -4.69E-08
SLOPE 0.039144517 0.034445 0.0351336
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Fable 4 . Rcgi ession Results For Increasing Mean of Money Growth Rate
Uniform Initial Distribution 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate
0.900
1.000
0.000
Inilation Coefficients CoelFicients
Mean Constant t value Real Output 1 value F
-0.04 -0.043 -7.786 0.003 0.546 0.298
-0.02 -0.043 -5.926 0.024 3.141 9.867
0 -0.043 -6.065 0.046 6.066 36.794
0.02 -0.031 -3.492 0.053 5.752 33.082
0.04 -0.025 -2.290 0.067 5.962 35.548
Uniform Initial Distribution
(1-Mistake Level) 0.950
Responsiveness Parameter 1.000
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate 0.000
InJlation CociricienLs Coellicients
Mean Constant t value Real Output t value F
-0.04 -0.035 -6.455 -0.005 -0.917 0.842
-0.02 -0.031 -6.105 0.011 2.110 4.451
0 -0.033 -6.823 0.035 6.824 46.565
0.02 -0.007 -0.916 0.028 3.539 12.525
0.04 -0.011 -1.450 0.052 6.705 44.953
Unifonu Initial Distribution
(1-Mistake Level) 0.800
Responsiveness Parameter 1.000
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate 0.000
Inilation Coefficients CoelFicicnls
Mean Constant t value Real Output 1t  value I
-0.04 -0.056 -10.740 0.020 3.119 9.726
-0.02 -0.068 -10.283 0.056 7.264 52.763
0 -0.101 -11.305 0.113 11.306 127.817
0.02 -0.078 -7.333 0.106 9.215 84.908
0.04 -0.077 -6.844 0.122 10.393 108.011
Uniionn Initial Distribution
(1-Mistake Level) 0.600
Responsivene.ss Parameter 1.000
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate 0.000
Inilation Cocllicients CoeOlcients
Mean Constant t value Real Output 1t value ]l-
-0.04 -0.092 -24.288 0.079 13.671 186.902
-0.02 -0.133 -24.140 0.155 20.517 420.946
0 -0.126 -35.925 0.156 35.924 1290.562
0.02 -0.143 -22.194 0.186 25.288 639.486
0.04 -0.160 -24.791 0.209 31.001 961.086
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F'igure 1. Behaviour o f the Eeonomy Initial Distribution Uniform 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 1st Half 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 2nd Half 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation of Money Growth Rate
0
0
0.95
1
0.0001
Figure 1 .a. Inflation Realization at any t During T
Figure Lb. Aggregate Price Level During T
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rigiire 1.1. Behaviour o f the Economy Initial Distribution Uniform 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 1st Half 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 2nd Half 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation of Money Growth Rate
0
0
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Figure 1.1 .b. Aggregate Price Level During 1'
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Figure 1.2. Behaviour o f the Economy Initial Distribution Uniform 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 1st Half 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 2nd Half 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation of Money Growth Rate
0
0
0.95
1
0.005
Figure 1.2.a. Inflation Realization at any t During T
Figure 1.2.b. Aggregate Price Level During T
61
Figure 2. Behaviour o f the Economy Initial Distribution Left Skewed 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 1st Half 
Mean of Money Growth Rate 2nd Half 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation of Money Growth Rate
0
0
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0.0001
Figure 2.a. Inflation Realization at any t During T
Figure 2.b. Aggregate Price Level During T
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Figure 3. Behaviour o f tlie Economy Initial Distribution Normal 
Mean of Money Growth Rale 1st Half 
Mean of Money Growth Rale 2nd Half 
(1-Mistake Level)
Responsiveness Parameter
Standard Deviation of Money Growth Rate
0
0
0.95
1
0.0001
F'igure 3.b. Aggregate Price Level During T
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Unifomi Initial Dumibution 
Mean оГ Money Growtli Rate 1st Half 
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Figure 5. Disiribution at Stationary State
Unifoim Initial Distribution
Mean o f  Money Growth Rate 1st Half -0.02
(1-Mistake Level) 0.95
Responsiveness Parameter 1
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate 0.0001
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Strategies
Figure 5,a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
Figure 5.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 6. Distribution at Stationary State
Uniform Initial Distribution
Mean o f  Money Growth Rate 1st Half 0
(1-Mistake Level) 0.95
Responsiveness Parameter 1
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate 0.0001
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Figure 6.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
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Figure 6.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 7. Distribution at Stationary State
Uniform Initial Distribution
Mean o f  Money Growth Rate 1 st Half 0.02
(1-Mistake Level) 0.95
Responsiveness Parameter 1
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Figure 7.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
Figure 7.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Tyi)e of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 8. Distribution at Stationary State
Uniform Initial Distribution
Mean o f  Money Growth Rate 1st Half 0.04
(1-Mistake Level) 0.95
Responsiveness Parameter 1
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate 0.0001
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Figure 8.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
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Figure 8.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 9. Distribution at Stationary State
Uniform Initial Distribution
Mean o f  Money Growth Rate 1st Half 0
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Figure 9.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
1.8 
1.6 - 
1.4 
1.2 
1
0.8 H 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0
B Total Supply 
□  Demand Met
8E-137 6f-1û9 2 3E·
-0
0E-54 2 6E-2Ö 1 59777
ODonian.JM<,l 8E-137 SE-109 2 3E-81 2 0E-26 1 59777
Strategies
Figure 9.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At Stationaiy State
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Figure 10. Distribution at Stationary State
Uniform Initial Distribution
Mean o f  Money Growth Rate 1st Half 0
(1-Mistake Level) 0.99
Responsiveness Parameter 1
Standard Deviation o f  Money Growth Rate 0.0001
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Figure lO.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
Figure lO.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Fum At Stationary State
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Figure 11. Effects of Increasing the Mean of Money Growth Rate on the Stationary State Uniform Initial Distribution
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Figure 12. Behaviour o f the Economy Uniform Initial Distribution
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Figure 16. Distribution at Stationary State
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Figure 16.a, Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
Figure 16.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Tyj)e of Firm At Stationary State
76
Figure 17. Distribution at Stationary State
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Figure 17.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
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Figure 18. Distribution at Stationary State
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Figure 18.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
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Figure 18.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 19 . Effects o f  Increasing Volatility on the Stationaty· State
Figure 19.a. Effects on the Mean o f Real Output
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Figure 20.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
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Figure 20.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 21. Distribution at Stationary State
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Figure 21.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationaiy State
Figure 21.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 22. Distribution at Stationary State
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Figure 22.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
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Figure 22.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Type of Firm At St.itionary State
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I'igure 23. Eilects of Decreasing tlie Mistake Level of Finns 
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Figure 23 .a. Effects of Decreasing Mistakes on the Slope of the Phillips Cur\'e
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Figure 23 .b. Effects of Decreasing Mistakes on the Mean of Real Output
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Figure 24. Distribution at Stationary State
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Figure 24.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategies During Stationary State
F'igure 24.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each Tyjie of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 25. Distribution at Stationary State
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Figure 25.a. Distribution o f  Supply Over Strategics During Stationary State
Figure 25.b. Total Supply versus Total Demand Met of Each T)rpe of Firm At Stationary State
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Figure 29. Effects o f the Responsiveness Parameter on the Statioitaiv State Uniform Initial Distribution 
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